Uh-oh! The bailout failed to pass…

September 30, 2008 at 4:40 am | Posted in credit, economics, Housing, regulations, Stock market | Leave a comment
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While I am not a fan of the bailout proposal, and have blogged about an alternative plan that incorporates support for homeowners – both those in trouble and those who might benefit from a price / inventory stabilization – here, something certainly needs to be done.

The NY Times cover story says it all –

Defying President Bush and the leaders of both parties, rank-and-file lawmakers in the House on Monday rejected a $700 billion economic rescue plan in a revolt that rocked the Capitol, sent markets plunging and left top lawmakers groping for a resolution.

It seems clear to me that the US economy, and the financial sector is clearly undercapitalized and does not have the wherewithal to absorb the kind of massive losses we have seen and are likely to continue to see. Wall Street needs help, and it needs help soon.


Wall Street is now Bank Street

September 22, 2008 at 11:07 am | Posted in credit, regulations, Stock market | Leave a comment
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Goldman and Morgan Stanley – the last remaining independent investment banks – have now requested they be treated like traditional banks, with all the regulations, oversight and capital requirements. While this is voluntary, it acknowledges the risk in the traditional model, and brings to a close the era of investment banks (created by the Glass Steagall Act after the Depression). Glass Steagall was slowly dismantled in the 1990s, but now, it is completely rolled back.

NYTimes has the story here

Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last big independent investment banks on Wall Street, will transform themselves into bank holding companies subject to far greater regulation, the Federal Reserve said Sunday night, a move that fundamentally reshapes an era of high finance that defined the modern Gilded Age.

As bank holding companies, the two banks, whose shares have lost about half their value this year, will have to reduce the amount of money they can borrow relative to their capital.

That will make them more financially sound but will also significantly limit their profits. Today, Goldman Sachs has $1 of capital for every $22 of assets; Morgan Stanley has $1 for every $30. By contrast, Bank of America’s has less than $11 for every $1 of capital.

So how would this work? If MS has to go from $1 capital for $30 assets to a more bank-like $10-11 assets per dollar of capital, one of two things have to happen – Either MS sells $20 worth of assets (2/3rds of what it has), and returns the proceeds to debt holders, or raises $2 more of capital.

The first would be disruptive to the markets, bringing a lot of selling pressure while every intervention is aimed at relieving the selling pressure. The second would be dilutive to existing shareholders – The share of existing shareholders would drop by 2/3rds. This is obviously bad for the stock, but, at least the losses are private and limited to shareholders, who kind of took on the risk in the first place.

So they will need time to adjust their balance sheets. Given enough time to get to the required capital ratios through a combination of asset sales and capital raising, and using additional classes of capital (such as preferreds and convertibles), they should be able to emerge as stronger institutions. And they can now buy a commercial bank to help get to the target ratios.

High noise-to-signal in SEC actions

September 20, 2008 at 1:20 pm | Posted in regulations, Stock market | Leave a comment
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This NYTimes article discusses the market reaction to the SEC rules banning short sales. A number of trades in the market were involuntary, forced on by the new regulations. As such, I doubt the strength in the market is sustainable. Nothing fundamental has changed; just a few rules changed, which made some people make transactions in the market in order to comply with the new rules, and made others make transactions in response to the market response. There is not much other information in the response, other than the fact that one can expect the government to continue to rescue and to regulate and market participants have to figure out where the heavy hand will fall next.

The pendulum swung far away from regulation during the “Bush expansion”, now, it is going to swing even further in the other direction.

We already know this. I think the SEC is saying that things are not as bad as they seem (as I said previously here), but then, is that what the SEC really believes, or is this just empty reassurance?

I guess, looking ahead and trying to decide what to do in the markets, this last week was mostly noise and  little signal.

Short selling – why it helps

September 20, 2008 at 12:57 pm | Posted in regulations, Stock market | Leave a comment
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First: Short selling means selling shares you don’t actually own. Traditional investors use their cash to buy shares, and at some later point, sell the shares back into cash, hopefully at a higher price for a profit. There are two transactions – first, they convert cash (which they have or borrow) into shares. Later, they convert the shares back into cash, and use the cash to pay off any money they borrowed to finance the transaction. A short seller basically reverses this order. First, they borrow shares they do not own, and sell them, converting into cash. Later, they use the cash to buy the shares back, and return the shares to the lender.

Say you were convinced that stock A will fall from $50, where it is currently trading. If you own the stock, you can sell your holding, and, suppose the stock did fall to $30, you could feel good that you avoided the $20 / share loss. But what if you don’t own the shares? How do you profit from your convictions? Well, you borrow a few shares, and sell them at $50. Later, when the stock falls to $30 you can buy them back, return the borrowed shares to the lender, and pocket the $20 difference (ignoring transaction costs, cost of borrowing the shares and taxes). That is basically what a short seller does.

The market combines tens of thousands of trades to arrive at a stock price. In other words, todays price reflects the combination of the information and beliefs that every participant in the market has about the stock. Some people are selling the stock – their views suggest they expect the stock to fall. Others are buying (for every sale, there is a buyer), and they expect the price to rise. Today’s price is just the momentary equilibrium between the forces propping the stock up and those pushing it down.

Banning short sales forces the market to ignore the information that the short sellers are bringing to the market. The supply of shares for sale will now come only from those who own the stock and are willing to sell. So the supply has fallen. Nothing prevents potential buyers from buying, so the demand curve remains the same, and the price equilibrium is artificially high because of less supply. So you have got rid of a good chunk of the sellers in the market, and a bunch of buyers who think the stock would have been cheap at $30 but wouldn’t touch it at $50 are also left out of the market. In the meantime, short sellers who have already sold the stock (who may or may not have wanted to sell more) know that the new equilibrium price is going to be higher than they expected, and the stock won’t fall as much as they had expected. So they try and buy back the stock to return the borrowed shares, pushing the stock up quickly (and temporarily). As the price rises, any one who is short the stock is losing money, so they all head for the exit, buying up shares to close their positions (so they can return the borrowed shares and square things off).

The rush of short sellers to close their positions is called a short squeeze, and it causes the stock price to overshoot. But then, once it is done, you have fewer sellers, and fewer buyers. Liquidity falls, and pricing becomes less efficient.

Suppose the short seller was right – The $50 stock is really worth $30. (We don’t really ever know what a stock is worth, but if the share price does reach $30 some day, then the market agrees, at least for that moment, that the stock is really worth $30). Eventually, that information will spread in the market, so, eventually you should see the price get to $50. But short selling helps you get there quicker. It can also cause the stock price to overshoot, and fall too low before recovering. But, generally, all this plays out relatively quickly. If the price overshoots, some of the short sellers will come in to buy and return the borrowed stock, locking in their profits. Other investors will find a price they cannot resist and will also buy in, bringing the stock back up.

All this is not perfect. But a fast-falling stock does not entice as many people as it falls, than one which gets from $50 to $30 over months instead of days. So, without short sales, more people will come in on the way down, get burnt, and stay away from the stock for months after it has bottomed. With, they come in later in the fall, hopefully find a great entry point if the stock has overshot, and feel reassured by the bounce back from the low to the more natural equilibrium point, providing better buying interest over time.

I do favor setting some limits on short sales – For example, what percentage of total shares can be lent out to short sellers. I am not sure what those limits are, but I would like to protect against an over-reaction. But over-reacting is better than not reacting enough – I would err on the side of the short sellers.

With short sellers, the market moves faster – but it also moves truer.

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